THE DEVICE TRUST MESH

Foundational hardware-rooted trust architecture for the Human Sovereignty Operating System

Instrument: The Device Trust Mesh

Function: Canonical architecture for hardware-rooted device identity, presence verification, trust scoring, authorization binding, and multi-device mesh synchronization across the Human Sovereignty Operating System — enabling Companions, Digital Twins, Life Graphs, Trust Vaults, KAAI Agents, Family Trust Networks, Organization Graphs, and sovereign governments to operate on a physical foundation of trust

Version: 1.0 (Founding Architecture)

Status: Subordinate to the Human Sovereignty Charter and all prior founding instruments; governed by the Companion Charter, Life Operating System, Human Digital Twin Architecture, Life Graph Architecture, Trust Vault Architecture, Family Trust Network, Organization Graph Enterprise Companion Framework, and KAAI Standard

Core constraint: Hardware must remain subordinate to human sovereignty. No device, secure element, carrier, manufacturer, or government holds standing root authority over a human's device trust estate by default.

Preamble

The digital age promised connection and delivered impersonation. Humans accumulated accounts across hundreds of services, credentials across dozens of devices, authorizations in opaque permission dialogs, and trust in platforms that could not answer a single question with integrity: Is the right human present on the right device at the right time, with the right intent, for the right action?

Identity without hardware anchor is theoretical. Authorization without presence verification is rhetorical. Trust without device integrity is liability. Inheritance without device succession is chaos. The Human Sovereignty Charter establishes rights — ownership, control, portability, inspectability, deletion, revocation, inheritance. Rights require architecture that implements them when devices are lost, stolen, compromised, replaced, or inherited.

This document defines the Device Trust Mesh — the foundational hardware-rooted trust architecture through which Keyra Companions, Human Digital Twins, Life Graphs, Trust Vaults, KAAI-authorized agents, Family Trust Networks, Organization Graphs, telecommunications carriers, vehicle systems, smart homes, and sovereign governments establish, verify, score, synchronize, and revoke trust across the physical devices that anchor human digital life.

The Device Trust Mesh connects Humans, Companions, Devices, Digital Twins, Life Graphs, Trust Vaults, KAAI Agents, Organizations, and Governments into a unified trust fabric. It is the physical foundation of trust in the Human Sovereignty Operating System. Identity begins with hardware. Trust begins with presence. Authorization begins with human intent.

The Mesh is designed to scale from one person to one billion humans — each operating multiple devices across personal, family, enterprise, national, and global contexts — without redesigning the constitutional invariants that subordinate all hardware to human sovereignty.

Preamble — Historical Context

The history of device trust is a history of institutional retrofit. Mainframes authenticated terminals to organizations, not humans to intentions. Personal computers authenticated users to operating systems with passwords stored in software. Smartphones introduced biometric convenience without standardized presence proofs portable across applications. Mobile Device Management enrolled devices to employers without granting humans portable trust. Public Key Infrastructure authenticated servers and occasionally devices to certificate authorities — rarely to sovereign humans with revocable, inspectable grant chains.

When artificial intelligence became persistent — Companions that remember, agents that act, twins that represent — the device fragment model collapsed. An agent cannot act responsibly without knowing which device holds authorized keys. A Companion cannot serve without continuity across handoffs. A family cannot inherit without device succession ceremonies. A court cannot attribute action without device-attested audit chains. The Device Trust Mesh closes the physical trust gap.

Preamble — Relationship to Founding Instruments

This Architecture is subordinate to the Human Sovereignty Charter. Where device technical requirements appear to conflict with human sovereignty, human sovereignty prevails and device implementations must be corrected. The Device Trust Mesh integrates with the Trust Vault Architecture (key custody and vault access binding), Life Graph Architecture (device nodes, trust edges, authorization graphs), Human Digital Twin Architecture (Twin persistence across device projections), Companion Charter (Companion-mediated device operations), KAAI Standard (device-bound agent authorization), Family Trust Network (family device sharing and inheritance), Organization Graph Enterprise Companion Framework (enterprise device governance), and Life Operating System (domain-scoped device policies).

No single instrument owns the device. The human owns the device trust relationship. The Life Graph indexes device topology. The Companion mediates human intent to device operations. KAAI agents receive derived access through authorization chains rooted in device-held keys and human presence proofs. Together they form the Human Sovereignty Operating System for durable digital life anchored in physical reality.

Preamble — Normative Language

Throughout this document:

MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, and SHALL denote absolute requirements for Device Trust Mesh conformance

SHOULD and RECOMMENDED denote strong guidance with documented exceptions permitted only under human or institutional policy with audit
MAY denotes optional capability
Prohibited actions are void regardless of technical success; device trust runtimes MUST reject them

Conformance is measured at three layers: constitutional (subordination to human authority), technical (attestation, certificates, mesh protocols), and operational (presence verification, trust scoring, incident response, lifecycle management).

Preamble — Architectural Placement

The Device Trust Mesh sits beneath human sovereignty and above application silos — the physical substrate on which vault, graph, companion, and agent layers operate:

```

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐

│ Human Sovereignty Charter │

├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ Companion · Twin · Life Graph · Vault │

├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ KAAI Standard · Family · Organization │

├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ Device Trust Mesh (this document) │

│ Identity · Presence · Trust · Auth │

├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ Keyra Key · Secure Element · TPM │

├──────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ Phone · Laptop · Vehicle · Home · IoT │

└──────────────────────────────────────────────┘

```

Applications are replaceable. Device trust roots and human binding are not — they belong to the human and persist across platform replacements when succession ceremonies execute.

Preamble — Scope of Support

The Device Trust Mesh supports:

| Domain | Entities |

|--------|----------|

| Humans | Sovereign device owners, presence subjects, authorization grantors |

| Companions | Device-mediated continuity, handoffs, recovery |

| Devices | Phones, wearables, keys, vehicles, homes, infrastructure |

| Digital Twins | Device-bound projections and behavioral continuity |

| Life Graphs | Device nodes, ownership edges, trust weights |

| Trust Vaults | Device-bound key access, vault partition unlock |

| KAAI Agents | Device-bound execution, attestation requirements |

| Families | Shared devices, guest access, inheritance succession |

| Organizations | Enterprise enrollment, compliance attestation |

| Governments | National device identity, lawful access channels |

| Carriers | SIM/eSIM identity, network trust overlays |

The Device Trust Mesh serves:

Individuals — personal device mesh under sole human authority

Families — federated device sharing with governed access
Organizations — institutional device estates subordinate to human members
Governments — lawful attestation overlays without root authority usurpation
Future Generations — device succession, inherited trust, legacy handoff

PART I — Definition

Section 1.01 — What Is a Device Trust Mesh?

The Device Trust Mesh is a hardware-rooted, cryptographically attested, human-sovereign architecture — comprising device identity, presence verification, trust scoring, authorization binding, mesh synchronization, and lifecycle governance — through which physical devices participate as trusted participants in the Human Sovereignty Operating System under explicit constitutional subordination to the Sovereign Human.

The Device Trust Mesh:

Anchors identity in hardware — secure elements, TPMs, Keyra Keys, manufacturer roots of trust
Verifies presence — the right human on the right device at the right time
Scores trust dynamically — integrity, behavior, companion binding, risk decay and repair
Binds authorization — grants cite device certificates and presence proofs
Synchronizes across devices — mesh protocols for trust state, not credential sprawl
Integrates with vaults — device unlocks partitions; vault holds keys devices use
Supports lifecycle — manufacture through destruction with audit at each transition
Scales globally — federated device registries without central human surveillance
Operates local-first — presence and high-risk authorization default to on-device proof

The Device Trust Mesh is the physical trust layer of the Human Sovereignty Operating System.

Section 1.01a — Device Trust Mesh as Constitutional Implementation

The Human Sovereignty Charter declares rights. The Life Graph Architecture declares structure. The Trust Vault Architecture declares persistence. The Device Trust Mesh declares physical anchoring — the material condition without which identity floats in vendor databases and authorization becomes a password guess. A Sovereign Human whose keys exist only in cloud HSMs controlled by platforms does not possess device sovereignty in any operational sense. A Sovereign Human whose devices enroll to employers without portable trust certificates does not possess portability in any cryptographic sense.

The Device Trust Mesh therefore occupies a position analogous to biometric civil registries in physical civilization — not surveillance infrastructure, but attestation infrastructure that binds persons to instruments they control. Without device trust, digital impersonation becomes routine.

Section 1.01b — Actors Served by the Device Trust Mesh

| Actor | Mesh role |

|-------|-----------|

| Sovereign Human | Root owner, presence subject, grantor |

| Keyra Companion | Mediator, continuity orchestrator, never root key holder |

| Human Digital Twin | Consumer of device-authorized projections |

| Device | Trusted participant with identity certificate |

| Keyra Key | Hardware authorization anchor |

| Family member | Shared device grantee per Family Constitution |

| Organization | Enterprise device custodian — not human root |

| KAAI agent | Device-bound executor |

| Carrier | Network identity overlay — subordinate to human |

| Government | Lawful attestation channel — not standing owner |

| Future beneficiary | Device succession recipient |

Each actor's relationship to the mesh is defined, bounded, auditable, and revocable — except the human root, whose sovereignty is inalienable.

Section 1.02 — What Is Not a Device Trust Mesh?

The Device Trust Mesh is not:

Device Management (MDM) — employer enrollment that treats devices as corporate property without human-portable trust

Mobile Device Management as sovereignty — compliance reporting without human-rooted revocation
Identity Systems alone — SSO directories that authenticate accounts without hardware presence
PKI alone — certificate hierarchies without human intent, presence, and lifecycle governance
Zero Trust alone — network perimeter philosophy without hardware-rooted human binding
A product SKU — feature toggle without constitutional conformance
A surveillance grid — continuous location tracking masquerading as security
Manufacturer lock-in — attestation chains that cannot port with human export
Compulsory national device registry — centralized inventory without individual revocation

If device trust cannot be revoked by the human root, it violates the Human Sovereignty Charter. If presence verification operates without human knowledge on personal devices, it violates transparency requirements. If device registration merges human sovereignty into platform ownership, it is not Device Trust Mesh conformance.

Section 1.03 — Distinctions Among Trust Systems

Device Management (MDM)

Device Management — Jamf, Intune, Workspace ONE — enrolls devices into organizational policy. MDM excels at compliance: patch status, encryption enforcement, app distribution, remote wipe on employment termination. MDM treats the device as organizational endpoint. The human using the device is often secondary to the employer's control plane.

The Device Trust Mesh incorporates MDM attestation as one input to enterprise device trust scores — but MDM is not the mesh. Human-owned personal devices operate in the mesh without MDM. Enterprise devices carry dual trust: organizational compliance attestation and human member sovereignty for personal partitions. MDM wipe on departure MUST NOT destroy human-rooted Trust Vault partitions without explicit policy separation documented at enrollment.

Identity Systems

Identity systems — Active Directory, Okta, Azure AD, federated identity — authenticate humans and service accounts to applications. They answer: who logged in? They rarely answer: which physical device holds the session? Is the human physically present? Has the device integrity degraded since login?

The Device Trust Mesh feeds identity systems with Device Trust Certificates and presence attestations. Identity sessions SHOULD bind to device_id and decay when device trust score falls below threshold. Identity without device binding is account security — not sovereign device trust.

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

PKI — certificate authorities, TLS, code signing — authenticates keys to names and organizations. Device certificates in traditional PKI often serve manufacturers and enterprises, not sovereign humans. Revocation is slow. Presence is absent. Human intent is not modeled.

The Device Trust Mesh uses PKI cryptographic primitives — X.509 or COSE certificates, CRL/OCSP — but roots device trust in human pairing ceremonies and Life Graph ownership edges. Manufacturer CA attestation is input, not owner.

Zero Trust

Zero Trust — never trust, always verify — correctly rejects perimeter security. Zero Trust architectures verify identity, device posture, and context on each request. They often lack: standardized human presence ceremonies, Keyra Key integration, Trust Vault binding, KAAI agent device requirements, family device sharing semantics, inheritance succession, and constitutional human supremacy.

The Device Trust Mesh implements Zero Trust principles with human-sovereign artifacts — Device Trust Certificates, presence proofs, trust scores — interoperable across Companion, Vault, and KAAI stacks. Zero Trust is philosophy; Device Trust Mesh is architecture.

Device Trust (Industry Generic)

Industry usage of "device trust" often denotes conditional access in cloud identity — Intune compliance feeds Azure AD policy. These systems serve tenant administrators, not sovereign humans. Trust does not port when employment ends. Family devices are unsupported. Vehicles and homes are afterthoughts.

The Device Trust Mesh defined here is human-rooted — institutional and carrier overlays are participants, not replacements.

Section 1.03a — Illustrative Scenario

Consider a sovereign professional: she owns a phone, laptop, Keyra Key, and smartwatch in her personal mesh. Each device holds a Device Identity Certificate bound to her human root in the Life Graph. Her Keyra Key signs high-risk authorizations — wire transfers, agent creation, vault partition export. Her Companion synchronizes context across devices — when she switches from phone to laptop, mesh handoff carries presence continuity without re-authentication theater.

Her employer provisions a laptop with MDM. Enterprise trust score incorporates compliance attestation; personal Trust Vault partition remains human-rooted on the same device with separate keys. Her family shares a home tablet under Family Constitution — children have bounded grants, guests have time-limited guest presence profiles.

When she travels internationally, carrier eSIM attestation feeds network trust; KAAI travel agent requires device trust above 0.7 and Keyra Key signature for itinerary changes affecting visas. When her phone is stolen, she revokes Device Trust Certificate from watch — mesh propagates revocation within SLA; thief possesses hardware without trust. When she replaces her Keyra Key, succession ceremony re-anchors authorization without invalidating Life Graph or Vault.

No platform owns the composite mesh. She does.

|--------|-----------------|------------|----------|-------------|---------------|

| MDM | Partial | Organization | No | No | No |

| Traditional PKI | Manufacturer | CA | No | Limited | No |

Section 1.04 — Why Future Trust Requires Hardware-Rooted Identity

Software-only identity fails under adversary pressure. Passwords leak. Tokens replay. Sessions hijack. Biometrics on device without secure element binding become software templates extractable on compromise. Cloud accounts restore to attacker-controlled devices with SMS second factors.

Future trust — billions of agents acting autonomously, digital twins representing humans in absentia, cross-border authorization, vehicle and home automation with safety consequences — requires:

Non-extractable keys in secure hardware

Attested integrity of device state at authorization time

Human presence proofs for consequential action

Revocation faster than attacker exfiltration

Portability across vendor and employment boundaries

Audit chains courts and regulators can inspect

Hardware-rooted identity is not nostalgia for smart cards. It is the minimum bar for civilization-scale trust when software agents outnumber humans and impersonation scales automatically.

Section 1.05 — Failure Scenarios the Mesh Prevents

Scenario A — Stolen phone, intact PIN: Attacker obtains unlocked phone. Pre-mesh: OAuth sessions remain valid; password resets via SMS succeed. Device Trust Mesh: human revokes DTC from watch; mesh CRL propagates; vault keys wrapped to revoked device become inaccessible; SMS port insufficient for vault; trust decay on anomalous behavior halts agents.

Scenario B — Employer termination: Pre-mesh: MDM full wipe destroys personal photos and vault. Device Trust Mesh: org partition revoked; personal partition exports via TVEP; human retains device trust certs on personal mesh; employment-bound agents suspend.

Scenario C — Compromised agent: Pre-mesh: API key exfiltration enables remote action. KAAI + Device Trust Mesh: agent bound to device_id; attacker lacks device attestation; out-of-scope actions halt; device trust decay triggers human notification.

Scenario D — SIM swap: Pre-mesh: account recovery via SMS compromises accounts. Device Trust Mesh: carrier identity is overlay only; Keyra Key and DIC required for consequential access; SIM swap increments risk score and alerts human on secondary channel.

Scenario E — Supply chain device: Pre-mesh: counterfeit phone with malware pre-installed. Device Trust Mesh: manufacturer attestation chain validation fails or flags anomaly; $ T_0 $ capped at 0.3 until human explicit trust elevation after inspection.

Section 1.06 — Relationship to Verifiable Credentials and FIDO

The Device Trust Mesh interoperates with W3C Verifiable Credentials for human identity attestations and FIDO2/WebAuthn for phishing-resistant authentication — but neither substitutes for Device Trust Certificates. FIDO answers "which authenticator responded"; the Mesh answers "which device, with what integrity, under which human grant, with what presence level." Implementations MAY embed FIDO assertions as supplementary presence evidence; they MUST NOT conflate FIDO authentication with full device trust conformance.

Section 1.07 — Implementation Roadmap for Organizations

Inventory — discover all device classes in estate; map to taxonomy Part III

Register — issue Device Identity Certificates; publish discovery records

Anchor — deploy Keyra Keys for executives and high-risk roles

Bind — map KAAI agents to device_binding requirements

Integrate — connect MDM attestation to integrity score feeds

Partition — separate org and personal vault partitions on BYOD

Audit — centralize device audit logs to Trust Vault

Federate — join regional registry shard; test CRL propagation

Succession — document device and Keyra Key inheritance in Legacy Vault

Certify — sector conformance assessment per class

Typical enterprise timeline: 18–36 months for full mesh conformance across critical device classes.

Section 1.08 — Document Map

| Part | Subject |

|------|---------|

| I | Definition |

| II | Foundational Principles |

| III | Device Classes |

| IV | Human Presence |

| V | Keyra Key Architecture |

| VI | Device Identity |

| VII | Device Trust Scoring |

| VIII | Device Graph |

| IX | Device Authorization |

| X | Multi-Device Mesh |

| XI | Device Trust Vault Integration |

| XII | Device + Companion Integration |

| XIII | Device + Agent Integration |

| XIV | Telecommunications Integration |

| XV | Vehicle Trust Architecture |

| XVI | Smart Home Trust Architecture |

| XVII | Enterprise Device Trust |

| XVIII | Sovereign Device Trust |

| XIX | Device Lifecycle |

| XX | Quantum & Future Security |

| XXI | Device Civilization Layer |

| XXII | Closing Declaration |

PART II — Foundational Principles

Section 2.01 — Human Sovereignty

The Sovereign Human owns the device trust estate absolutely. Ownership includes all device registrations, trust certificates, presence policies, mesh memberships, and succession designations. Ownership is inalienable — devices may be custodied by organizations or manufacturers during repair, but trust root remains human unless explicit voluntary transfer executes.

Implementations MUST represent device ownership in Life Graph as `Human → owns → Device`. No edge may assign `Platform → owns → Device` without explicit human-initiated migration where human retains root.

Section 2.02 — Device Sovereignty

Device Sovereignty means each device maintains its own hardware root of trust, identity certificate, and integrity attestation — while remaining subordinate to human ownership. A device is a participant, not a sovereign. Device autonomy — autonomous vehicles, home controllers — operates within human-granted authority certificates, never self-granted root.

Devices MUST NOT generate human-root authority. Devices MAY generate device-scoped authority for subordinate IoT endpoints when human provisioning ceremony delegates.

Section 2.03 — Hardware Trust

Trust begins in hardware — secure elements, TPMs, HSMs, Keyra Keys. Software attestations without hardware anchor are advisory only. High-risk actions MUST require hardware-backed signatures.

| Trust anchor | Typical use |

|--------------|-------------|

| Secure Enclave / TEE | Phone, laptop biometric gating |

| TPM 2.0 | Enterprise laptop integrity |

| Keyra Key | Human presence and authorization |

| Smart card / HSM | Government, financial |

| IoT secure element | Constrained device identity |

Hardware trust MUST be measurable, attestable, and revocable through certificate invalidation.

Section 2.04 — Presence Verification

Presence Verification proves the right human is at the device during consequential action. Presence modalities include: Keyra Key tap, biometric unlock with secure element binding, multi-device corroboration (watch confirms phone), and time-bounded presence tokens with decay.

Presence is not continuous surveillance. Presence is action-gated proof — verified when authorization requires, logged with audit reference, absent by default.

Section 2.05 — Authorization Verification

Every device-mediated action MUST cite Authorization Verification — validated grant chain from human root, scoped to device class, presence level, and trust score threshold. Default deny. No grant — no action.

Authorization Verification integrates KAAI Authorization Certificates, Trust Vault partition policies, and Device Authority Certificates.

Section 2.06 — Trust Portability

The Sovereign Human MUST export device trust state in Device Trust Export Pack (DTEP) — device certificates, mesh membership, trust scores, pairing records, succession designations — without vendor gatekeeping. DTEP interoperates with Trust Vault Export Pack.

Portability MUST survive employment termination, carrier change, and platform migration.

Section 2.07 — Trust Revocation

Every device trust relationship MUST be revocable by human root or authorized delegate. Revocation categories:

| Category | Revocation trigger |

|----------|-------------------|

| Personal device | Human immediate |

| Stolen device | Human or automated anomaly |

| Family shared device | Human or Family Constitution |

| Enterprise device | Human personal partition; org org partition |

| Agent-bound device | KAAI revocation + device cert revoke |

| Compromised device | Human or incident response |

| Government overlay | Legal instrument expiry |

Revocation MUST propagate across mesh within SLA (RECOMMENDED: < 60 seconds for personal mesh; < 5 minutes for global federation).

Section 2.08 — Trust Auditability

All device trust events — registration, pairing, presence proofs, authorization uses, trust score changes, revocations — MUST append to immutable audit logs with hash chains. Logs export to Trust Vault Agent partition and human-inspectable history.

Opacity — hidden device reads, undisclosed attestation transmission — is prohibited on personal devices.

Section 2.09 — Trust Inheritance

Device trust inherits through governed succession — not automatic account recovery. Inheritance Instruments in Legacy Vault designate device succession beneficiaries, Keyra Key replacement ceremonies, and mesh membership transfers. Inheritance execution requires identity verification and audit.

Default platform recovery — security questions — is prohibited for vault-bound devices.

Section 2.10 — Trust Expiration

Device certificates, presence tokens, and mesh memberships MUST carry expiration. Expired trust requires renewal ceremony — not silent extension. Trust decay accelerates toward expiration without positive evidence.

| Artifact | Default validity |

|----------|------------------|

| Device Identity Certificate | 1 year |

| Device Trust Certificate | 90 days rolling |

| Presence token | 5–15 minutes |

| IoT constrained cert | 24 hours |

| Keyra Key binding | Until succession or revoke |

Section 2.11 — Principle Enforcement Matrix

| Principle | Technical enforcement | Human-facing enforcement |

|-----------|----------------------|--------------------------|

| Human sovereignty | Human-root pairing only | Device ownership dashboard |

| Device sovereignty | Per-device hardware keys | Device detail view |

| Hardware trust | Attestation gate | Trust score display |

| Presence | Action-gated proof | Companion confirmation |

| Authorization | Default deny engine | Grant review UI |

| Portability | DTEP export | One-click mesh export |

| Revocation | CRL + mesh pub/sub | Revoke device button |

| Auditability | Hash-chained logs | Access history |

| Inheritance | Succession ceremony | Legacy preflight |

| Expiration | Auto-expire certs | Renewal prompts |

Violations MUST surface as errors — not silent degradation.

Section 2.12 — Tension Resolution

Principles occasionally tension:

Presence vs privacy — presence proofs reveal action timing, not continuous location; family policies declare visibility

Enterprise MDM vs personal sovereignty — dual partitions with separate keys; org wipe scoped
Portability vs anti-theft — revoked devices export metadata only; keys destroyed
Trust decay vs convenience — low-risk actions permit lower presence; high-risk never waives

Resolution always favors human root authority after policy-declared emergency expiry.

PART III — Device Classes

Section 3.01 — Taxonomy Overview

Devices classify by form factor, trust capability, ownership model, and risk tier. Classification determines minimum attestation requirements, presence modalities, certificate profiles, and mesh roles.

Section 3.02 — Personal Computing Devices

Phone

Primary personal mesh hub. Full secure element, biometric presence, Companion runtime, Trust Vault primary replica (RECOMMENDED). Trust tier: Personal Critical.

Tablet

Shared-capable personal device. Trust tier: Personal Standard or Family Shared when designated.

Laptop

Productivity anchor; TPM attestation; enterprise dual-partition common. Trust tier: Personal Critical or Enterprise Managed.

Desktop

Stationary personal or organizational compute. Trust tier: Personal Standard or Enterprise Managed.

Section 3.03 — Wearables

Watch

Presence corroboration device; mesh secondary authenticator. Trust tier: Personal Accessory — cannot alone authorize high-risk without phone or Keyra Key corroboration unless explicitly configured.

Wearables (general)

Fitness bands, AR glasses, health sensors. Trust tier: Personal Accessory or Health Bound with Health Vault integration.

Section 3.04 — Keyra Key

Dedicated hardware authorization anchor. Trust tier: Authorization Root — signs human intent; does not store Life Graph or agent logic. See Part V.

Section 3.05 — Shared and Family Devices

Family Devices

Tablets, home screens, shared laptops — governed by Family Constitution. Multiple human presence profiles; bounded child grants. Trust tier: Family Shared.

Shared Devices

Co-working, library, kiosk — minimal trust; guest profiles only. Trust tier: Guest Ephemeral — no vault access by default.

Section 3.06 — Institutional Devices

Organization Devices

Employer-provisioned; MDM attestation; dual personal/org partitions. Trust tier: Enterprise Managed.

Infrastructure Devices

Servers, gateways, edge nodes — host agent runtimes. Trust tier: Infrastructure — human authorization at provision.

Government Devices

Sovereign attestation CA; physical security modules. Trust tier: Government Classified Overlay per national policy.

Section 3.07 — Environment and Mobility Devices

Vehicle Device

Automotive compute, IVI, telematics — see Part XV. Trust tier: Vehicle Critical.

Home Device

Smart home hubs, speakers, appliances — see Part XVI. Trust tier: Home Bound.

IoT Device

Sensors, actuators, constrained endpoints — lightweight certificates, gateway delegation. Trust tier: IoT Constrained.

Industrial Device

SCADA, manufacturing, medical equipment — sector certification. Trust tier: Industrial Certified.

Future Autonomous Device

Robots, drones, autonomous agents with embodiment — human-granted operational authority; no self-sovereignty. Trust tier: Autonomous Delegated — authority expires without renewal.

Section 3.08 — Legacy Device Class Labels

Prior taxonomy labels Vehicle Devices, Home Devices, IoT Devices, Industrial Devices, and Future Autonomous Devices map to the singular class definitions above.

Section 3.09 — Trust Classification Matrix

|-------|--------------|----------|----------------|---------------|

Section 3.10 — Class Migration

Devices MAY migrate class with human ceremony — e.g., personal phone becomes family tablet after factory reset with new pairing. Class migration MUST revoke prior certificates and audit.

PART IV — Human Presence

Section 4.01 — Presence as Foundation

Presence is the bridge between hardware and intent. The Device Trust Mesh verifies presence before consequential authorization — answering: Is the right human on the right device at the right time for the right action?

Presence is distinct from authentication. Authentication proves account credentials. Presence proves physical human engagement with trusted hardware.

Section 4.02 — Presence Verification

Presence Verification combines:

Unlock event — biometric or PIN with secure element binding

Freshness window — unlock valid for bounded duration per action risk
Corroboration — secondary device attestation when required
Keyra Key tap — hardware proof for high-risk
Context signals — time, location (opt-in), network — advisory only, never sole proof

Implementations MUST NOT treat password-only remote login as presence for high-risk device actions.

Section 4.03 — Human Verification

Human Verification confirms the sovereign human — not delegate, not twin autonomous mode — is the presence subject. Twin projections and KAAI agents operate under separate authorization classes; they do not satisfy human presence for human-sovereign grants unless explicit Absent Human Protocol in Authorization Vault permits.

Section 4.04 — Companion Verification

The Keyra Companion MAY corroborate presence — voice match, conversational challenge, behavioral continuity — as supplementary evidence. Companion verification alone MUST NOT replace hardware presence for high-risk actions.

Companion MUST disclose when presence inference influences authorization.

Section 4.05 — Device Verification

Device Verification confirms the requesting endpoint is the registered device with valid integrity attestation. Device verification without human presence proves device health — not human intent.

Section 4.06 — Intent Verification

Intent Verification confirms the human understood the action — display of scope, consequence summary, explicit confirm for irreversible operations. Intent pairs with presence; both required for vault export, agent creation, ownership transfer.

Section 4.07 — Context Verification

Context Verification evaluates advisory context — unusual location, atypical time, velocity anomalies. Context MAY raise trust requirements; context MUST NOT silently deny without human-visible explanation and override path.

Section 4.08 — Presence Levels

| Level | Requirements | Typical actions |

|-------|--------------|-----------------|

| P0 — Latent | Device locked | None |

| P1 — Unlocked | Biometric/PIN unlock | Read low-sensitivity |

| P2 — Active | Unlock + freshness < 5 min | Standard companion ops |

| P3 — Attested | P2 + device attestation | Vault read, agent low-risk |

| P4 — Corroborated | P3 + watch/second device | Medium-risk execute |

| P5 — Keyra | P3 + Keyra Key signature | High-risk, financial, succession |

Section 4.09 — Presence Decay

Presence level decays with time and risk:

\[ P_{\mathrm{eff}} = P_{\max} \cdot e^{-\delta \Delta t} \]

Default $ \delta = 0.05 $ per minute for P2; high-risk actions reset requirement to P5 regardless of decay curve.

Section 4.10 — Illustrative Scenario — Right Human, Right Device, Right Time, Right Action

Maria authorizes a $10,000 charitable transfer. Authorization Engine requires: Device Trust Score ≥ 0.75, Presence P5 (Keyra Key), Intent confirmation with charity name and amount, Device Verification attestation < 60 seconds old, KAAI Financial agent Authorization Certificate valid, Trust Vault Asset partition grant.

Maria unlocks phone (P2), opens Companion, confirms transfer. System escalates to P5 — she taps Keyra Key. Attestation passes. Grant chain validates. Transfer executes. Audit log records: human_id, device_ids, presence_level, intent_hash, grant_ids, timestamp.

Wrong device — laptop without registered cert — denied. Wrong time — expired presence — denied. Wrong action — amount exceeds grant — denied. Right human, right device, right time, right action — permitted.

Section 4.11 — Presence Failure Handling

Failed presence MUST NOT leak whether account exists. Repeated failures trigger trust decay and optional human notification via secondary channel. Lockout policies MUST preserve human recovery via Keyra Key succession — not vendor support monopoly.

Section 4.12 — Absent Human Protocol

When humans are legitimately unavailable — surgery, wilderness travel, incarceration with rights preserved — Authorization Vault MAY contain Absent Human Protocol templates: pre-delegated scopes, duration limits, co-signer requirements, automatic expiry, enhanced audit. Absent Human Protocol is not default; it requires P5 Keyra establishment. Twins and agents operate under explicit Absent Human grants — never implicit continuity.

Section 4.13 — Presence in Shared Family Context

Family shared devices maintain presence profiles per family member. Child profile: bounded apps, no financial vault, parental visibility into grant usage not content without read grant. Elder profile: simplified UI, optional guardian co-presence for high-risk. Profile switch requires authentication appropriate to profile class.

Section 4.14 — Presence Verification Ceremony Catalog

| Ceremony | Presence level | Duration |

|----------|----------------|----------|

| Biometric unlock | P1–P2 | Until lock |

| Watch unlock corroboration | P4 | 15 min |

| Keyra Key tap | P5 | Single action or 5 min window |

| Voice challenge (supplementary) | +0.1 to $ P_s $ | N/A |

| Multi-device corroboration | P4–P5 | Configurable |

Section 4.15 — Regulatory and Forensic Presence

Lawful access channels per Human Sovereignty Charter MAY require device presence logs with court order — scoped to time window and device_id. Forensic exports include presence level and attestation hash — not continuous location history unless separately authorized.

PART V — Keyra Key Architecture

Section 5.01 — Keyra Key Definition

The Keyra Key is a dedicated hardware device — secure element form factor — serving as Authorization Anchor for the Sovereign Human. It stores human-root signing keys non-extractably. It performs cryptographic signatures on human request. It does not run Companion logic, Life Graph, or agent inference.

The Keyra Key is the physical manifestation of human intent in the Device Trust Mesh.

Section 5.02 — Hardware Root of Trust

Keyra Key contains:

Secure element — tamper-resistant key storage

User interface — minimal display, tactile confirm
Wireless interface — NFC/BLE for tap ceremonies
Firmware — signed updates, human-confirmed apply

Root keys NEVER export. Backup is succession-based — not clone-based.

Section 5.03 — Identity Anchor

Keyra Key holds Identity Anchor key — signs Device Identity Certificate requests, human presence attestations, and pairing ceremonies. Life Graph records `Human → anchored_by → KeyraKey`.

Section 5.04 — Authorization Anchor

Authorization Anchor signs: high-risk financial transfers, KAAI agent creation and scope expansion, Trust Vault partition export, device succession, emergency revocation bundles, Legacy Vault inheritance triggers.

Authorization signatures include: action hash, scope, timestamp, device_id, nonce.

Section 5.05 — Companion Anchor

Keyra Key binds Companion instance — `Companion → bound_to → KeyraKey`. Companion migration to new runtime requires Keyra Key re-binding ceremony. Prevents Companion hijack without physical key.

Section 5.06 — Trust Vault Anchor

Trust Vault root key derivation MAY incorporate Keyra Key HSM interaction — key never leaves vault partition and Keyra Key combined policy. Vault unlock for Legacy partitions requires Keyra Key per inheritance instrument.

Section 5.07 — Pairing

Pairing ceremony: Human unlocks Keyra Key → scans device QR → device generates ephemeral key → Keyra Key signs device registration → Life Graph edge created → Trust Vault records pairing cert.

Pairing MUST occur in person. Remote pairing requires existing mesh device at P5 corroboration.

Section 5.08 — Provisioning

Factory provisioning installs firmware, secure element personalization, and blank human slot. Human claims Keyra Key via first-boot ceremony linking to human Identity Vault.

Section 5.09 — Recovery

Recovery when Keyra Key lost: human identity verification per Trust Vault Recovery policy, waiting period, mesh device corroboration, issuance of replacement Keyra Key, revocation of lost key, re-signing of active grants. Recovery MUST NOT be instant — prevents coerced recovery.

Section 5.10 — Replacement

Replacement — planned upgrade to new Keyra Key — succession ceremony transfers anchors, overlapping validity window 7 days, audit of all re-signed grants.

Section 5.11 — Retirement

Retirement — deliberate end of Keyra Key use — requires migration to replacement or explicit vault policy abandoning hardware anchor (NOT RECOMMENDED for high-risk humans).

Section 5.12 — Succession

Succession — death or incapacity — executes per Legacy Vault instrument. Beneficiary or executor completes identity verification, waiting period per instrument, receives successor Keyra Key or alternate authorization path if deceased designated software-only recovery for specific partitions.

Keyra Key succession is the physical analog of executor receiving safe deposit key.

Section 5.13 — Keyra Key Prohibitions

Keyra Key MUST NOT: store plaintext vault contents, run third-party apps, auto-sign without human tactile confirm, enroll to employer without human acknowledgment, or transmit location continuously.

Section 5.14 — Keyra Key Certificate Structure

```json

{

"cert_type": "keyra_key",

"key_id": "uuid",

"human_root": "uuid",

"secure_element_attestation": "base64",

"firmware_version": "semver",

"companion_binding": "uuid",

"valid_until": "ISO8601"

}

```

Section 5.15 — Keyra Key Threat Model

| Threat | Mitigation |

|--------|------------|

| Physical theft | PIN + rate limit; remote revoke |

| Coerced tap | Duress PIN triggers silent revoke |

| Supply chain implant | Manufacturer attestation + human inspection |

| Relay attack | Proximity time bound < 2s |

| Firmware downgrade | Signed updates only; rollback prohibited |

| Clone attempt | Non-extractable keys; monotonic counters |

Section 5.16 — Keyra Key and Financial Authorization

Financial Authorization per KAAI Standard Part XVI SHOULD require Keyra Key for transactions above human-configured threshold (default: any amount above daily habit). Keyra Key displays amount and payee on trusted screen before sign.

Section 5.17 — Illustrative Scenario — Keyra Succession

Patriarch age 78 designates daughter as Keyra successor in Legacy Vault. On death, executor triggers inheritance. Daughter completes identity verification, 30-day waiting period per instrument. Successor Keyra Key provisioned. Patriarch's Keyra tombstoned. Daughter re-signs active family device grants. Family mesh continuity preserved. Audit published to family members per Family Constitution.

PART VI — Device Identity

Section 6.01 — Identity Framework Overview

Every mesh participant device holds cryptographically verifiable Device Identity — distinct from human identity, account identity, and agent identity. Device identity enables attribution, trust scoring, and revocation targeting.

Section 6.02 — Device Identity Certificate

Device Identity Certificate (DIC) binds: device_id (UUID), device class, hardware attestation public key, manufacturer attestation chain, owner_human_id, issuance timestamp, validity period.

```json

{

"cert_type": "device_identity",

"device_id": "uuid",

"device_class": "phone",

"hw_pubkey": "base64",

"manufacturer_attestation": "base64",

"owner_human": "uuid",

"valid_until": "ISO8601"

}

```

DIC MUST be signed by accredited Device Registrar with human pairing co-signature.

Section 6.03 — Device Trust Certificate

Device Trust Certificate (DTC) binds: device_id, current trust score, integrity attestation summary, presence capability level, companion_id, mesh_membership_id, valid_until (short-lived, RECOMMENDED 90 days rolling).

DTC renews on successful attestation. Compromised devices fail renewal.

Section 6.04 — Device Authority Certificate

Device Authority Certificate (DAC) defines what actions device may mediate — vault partitions accessible, agent classes runnable, maximum transaction values, presence levels issuable. DAC is human-granted, device-bound.

Section 6.05 — Device Registration Framework

Registration requires: human pairing ceremony, hardware attestation, Life Graph `owns` edge, Trust Vault device record, initial trust score assignment $ T_0 = 0.5 $ for personal critical devices from reputable manufacturer.

Re-registration after wipe MUST issue new device_id — prohibit identity recycling without audit.

Section 6.06 — Device Discovery Framework

Discovery resolves device_id to: current DTC, mesh endpoints, companion binding, revocation status. Discovery operates federated — personal devices resolve via Companion cache; global devices via regional registry shards.

Discovery MUST NOT expose owner home address or continuous location by default.

Section 6.07 — Device Lifecycle Framework

Lifecycle states: Manufactured → Registered → Provisioned → Active → Suspended → Revoked → Destroyed. See Part XIX. State transitions require audit and human authorization except automated suspension on integrity failure.

Section 6.08 — Global Device Registry

Global Device Registry federates national and vendor shards. Records: device_id, owner_human_id (pseudonymous ref), cert public keys, revocation status, class, jurisdiction tags.

Registry holds no vault contents, no biometrics, no continuous telemetry. Human Sovereignty Charter portability rights apply to registry entries.

Section 6.09 — Device Identity and KAAI Interoperability

KAAI Device Certificate (per KAAI Standard Part XIV) MUST map to DIC/DTC fields for unified validation. Agent runtimes validate both KAAI device binding and Device Trust Mesh certificates in single gate.

Section 6.10 — Device Registrar Accreditation

Device Registrars — manufacturers, OEMs, accredited third parties — MUST pass governance council accreditation. Accreditation requires: secure manufacturing audit, CRL infrastructure, incident response SLA, human pairing ceremony support, prohibition on pre-bound surveillance keys.

Section 6.11 — Revocation Infrastructure

Revocation uses partitioned CRL distribution, OCSP responders, and mesh pub/sub for personal devices. Revocation events MUST propagate to: Global Device Registry shard, Trust Vault audit, KAAI agent runtimes, Companion cache.

Target SLA: personal mesh < 60s; global federation < 5 minutes p99.

Section 6.12 — Device Identity Rotation

Device keys SHOULD rotate annually or on compromise suspicion. Rotation ceremony: generate new key in secure element, Keyra Key co-signs new DIC, old DIC tombstoned with overlap window 24h for in-flight operations.

PART VII — Device Trust Scoring

Section 7.01 — Trust Score Overview

Trust Score $ T \in [0,1] $ quantifies device trustworthiness for authorization decisions. Trust is dynamic — earned, decayed, repaired, revoked.

Section 7.02 — Component Scores

Composite device trust:

\[ T = w_p P_s + w_i I_s + w_a A_s + w_c C_s + w_b B_s - R_s \]

Weights sum to 1 per device class profile.

| Component | Symbol | Description |

|-----------|--------|-------------|

| Presence Score | $ P_s $ | Recent presence quality |

| Integrity Score | $ I_s $ | Hardware/OS attestation |

| Authorization Score | $ A_s $ | Grant compliance history |

| Companion Score | $ C_s $ | Companion binding health |

| Behavior Score | $ B_s $ | Anomaly-free operation |

| Risk Score | $ R_s $ | Subtracts for threats detected |

Section 7.03 — Presence Score

$ P_s $ derives from recent presence events — P5 Keyra events weigh highest. Decay without unlock: $ P_s \to 0 $ over 24h inactive.

Section 7.04 — Integrity Score

$ I_s $ from attestation: secure boot, OS patch level, jailbreak/root detection, MDM compliance (enterprise), screen lock enabled. Compromised attestation → $ I_s = 0 $, automatic Suspension.

Section 7.05 — Authorization Score

$ A_s $ tracks grant violations — halted out-of-scope actions decrement; compliant actions increment slowly.

Section 7.06 — Companion Score

$ C_s $ reflects Companion binding validity, version currency, duty-of-care metrics per Companion Charter.

Section 7.07 — Behavior Score

$ B_s $ from statistical anomaly detection — impossible travel, credential stuffing patterns, bulk export attempts. Advisory algorithms MUST NOT auto-revoke without human-review path for high false-positive risk.

Section 7.08 — Risk Score

$ R_s \in [0, 0.5] $ aggregates threat intelligence — known malware, revoked manufacturer certs, stolen device reports. $ R_s > 0.3 $ triggers human notification.

Section 7.09 — Trust Decay

\[ T_t = T_{last} \cdot e^{-\lambda \Delta t} \]

Default $ \lambda = 0.005 $ per day personal devices; $ \lambda = 0.02 $ enterprise financial devices.

Section 7.10 — Trust Repair

Incident classification

Device Suspension

Remediation — patch, wipe, re-attestation

Human acknowledgment

Probation — elevated presence requirements

Floor reset $ T = 0.4 $ unless human sets higher

Section 7.11 — Trust Recovery

Post-theft recovery on new device: new DIC, succession from human root, inherited mesh membership, trust starts $ T_0 = 0.5 $, probation 30 days.

Section 7.12 — Trust Revocation

Revocation sets $ T = 0 $, invalidates DTC, publishes CRL, suspends bound KAAI agents per device binding, notifies mesh peers.

Section 7.13 — Trust Thresholds

| Action risk | Minimum $ T $ |

|-------------|-----------------|

| Read low-sensitivity | 0.3 |

| Companion standard | 0.4 |

| Vault read | 0.5 |

| Medium-risk execute | 0.6 |

| High-risk / financial | 0.75 |

| Vault export | 0.8 + Keyra |

Section 7.14 — Worked Example

New phone paired with Keyra Key: $ T_0 = 0.55 $. After 30 days compliant use, $ T = 0.72 $. Jailbreak detected: $ I_s = 0 $, $ T = 0.15 $, Suspension, human notified. After wipe and re-pairing: $ T = 0.5 $, probation 30 days at P5 for vault access.

Section 7.15 — Trust Evidence Types

Trust updates derive from evidence $ E_t \in [-1, 1] $:

| Evidence | Typical $ E_t $ |

|----------|-------------------|

| Successful attestation renewal | +0.05 to +0.10 |

| Human explicit trust increase | +0.10 to +0.25 |

| P5 Keyra authorization success | +0.03 |

| Minor policy violation (halted) | -0.15 |

| Integrity failure | -0.50 to -1.0 |

| Reported stolen (unconfirmed) | -0.30 |

| Remediation completed | +0.10 (repair path) |

| Decay period without unlock | applied via decay formula |

Section 7.16 — Trust Scoring Algorithm (Complete)

Initialization: New Personal Critical device from accredited manufacturer: $ T_0 = 0.4 + 0.15 \cdot M_{att} + 0.1 \cdot K_{bound} $ where $ M_{att} $ is manufacturer attestation quality (0–1) and $ K_{bound} = 1 $ if Keyra Key paired at registration. Cap $ T_0 = 0.65 $.

Update (exponential moving average):

\[ T_{t+1} = \mathrm{clamp}\big( \alpha T_t + (1-\alpha) E_t,\ 0,\ 1 \big) \]

Default $ \alpha = 0.80 $. Enterprise financial devices use $ \alpha = 0.65 $.

Composite integrity:

\[ I_s = w_{hw} A_{hw} + w_{os} A_{os} + w_{mdm} A_{mdm} \]

Default weights: $ w_{hw} = 0.5, w_{os} = 0.35, w_{mdm} = 0.15 $ (MDM zero on personal devices).

Section 7.17 — Adversarial Trust Resistance

Prohibited: synthetic attestation inflation, Sybil device registration farms, trust purchase without audit, manufacturer bribery for backdated certs. Registries detect anomalous trust velocity; rate-limit manual increases; require Keyra co-signature for $ \Delta T > 0.20 $ in single day.

Section 7.18 — Trust and Authorization Feedback Loop

Low device trust automatically raises `min_device_trust` requirements in active KAAI grants — grants do not silently become unusable; human notified to remediate device or revoke agent. High trust does not auto-elevate authority — elevation always requires new Authorization Certificate.

Section 7.19 — Trust Privacy

Device trust scores are personal data — GDPR and equivalent subject rights apply. Public device trust leaderboards prohibited. Aggregated anonymized statistics permitted for research with governance council approval.

PART VIII — Device Graph

Section 8.01 — Graph Overview

The Device Graph — subgraph of Life Graph — models devices, relationships, trust, authority, presence, and usage. Edges are typed, weighted, auditable.

Section 8.02 — Human → Device

`Human → owns → Device` — sovereign ownership. `Human → uses → Device` — episodic usage on shared devices. `Human → succession → Device` — inheritance designation.

Section 8.03 — Companion → Device

`Companion → bound_to → Device` — primary runtime host. `Companion → synchronizes_with → Device` — mesh members. Companion never `owns` Device.

Section 8.04 — Agent → Device

`Agent → executes_on → Device` per KAAI device binding. `Agent → requires → DeviceClass` in Authority Certificate.

Section 8.05 — Family → Device

`Family → shares → Device` under Family Constitution. `Child → bounded_use → Device` with parental authority.

Section 8.06 — Organization → Device

`Organization → manages → Device` for enterprise partition. `Employee → custodies → Device` dual-use.

Section 8.07 — Ownership Graph

Ownership Graph is acyclic rooted at Human for personal devices. Organization ownership of device hardware does not confer Trust Vault root.

Section 8.08 — Trust Graph

Trust edges: `Human → trusts → Device` weighted by $ T $. Trust propagates to agents bound to device with $ T_{eff} = \min(T_{human \to device}, T_{human \to agent}) \cdot \beta $.

Section 8.09 — Authority Graph

Authority edges cite DAC and KAAI grants. Path validation: Human → Device → Agent → Action.

Section 8.10 — Presence Graph

Ephemeral edges: `Human → present_at → Device` with timestamp and level. Expire automatically. Feed audit, not permanent surveillance profile.

Section 8.11 — Usage Graph

Usage edges: frequency, last active, installed vault partitions — inform trust decay and companion handoff optimization. Usage data stays human-inspectable; exportable; deletable.

Section 8.12 — Graph Query Patterns

Common authorization queries on Device Graph:

| Query | Purpose |

|-------|---------|

| `Human → owns → Device` | Enumerate mesh membership |

| `Device → executes_on → Agent` | List bound agents |

| `Human → present_at → Device` | Current presence (ephemeral) |

| `Device → trust_score` | Authorization threshold check |

| `Family → shares → Device` | Family policy validation |

Section 8.13 — Graph Federation

Device Graph subgraphs federate into Life Graph without merging sovereignty. Family subgraph visible to family members per constitution. Organization subgraph visible to org admins for org devices only — not personal devices of employees.

Section 8.14 — Illustrative Scenario — Device Graph Forensics

After unauthorized vault access attempt, human inspects Device Graph audit: unknown device_id attempted read; no `owns` edge; trust score N/A; attempt denied at gate. Graph reveals compromised KAAI agent on legitimate laptop — agent cert valid but action scope exceeded; agent suspended; laptop trust repaired. Attribution complete without platform support ticket.

PART IX — Device Authorization

Section 9.01 — Authorization Overview

Device authorization translates human grants into action permits validated at runtime. Chains root in human sovereignty, cite device certificates, require presence and trust thresholds.

Section 9.02 — Authorization Chains

Standard chain: Human Root Grant → Device Authority Certificate → KAAI Authorization Certificate (if agent) → Action Token (ephemeral).

Each link MUST validate: signature, expiry, scope, revocation status.

Section 9.03 — Delegation Chains

Humans MAY delegate device administration to family members or IT — bounded depth RECOMMENDED max 2 hops. Delegation does not transfer ownership.

\[ Auth_{eff} = \bigcap_{hop} Scope_{hop} \]

Section 9.04 — Approval Chains

Multi-party approval for high-risk: spouse co-sign for legacy vault, board approval for executive device wipe, parent approval for child agent creation. Approval chains use Keyra Key or equivalent P5 presence per approver.

Section 9.05 — Emergency Chains

Emergency access — medical incapacity, disaster — per Authorization Vault Emergency templates. Time-bounded, enhanced audit, post-event human review mandatory. Emergency does not bypass cryptographic validation — uses pre-authorized break-glass grants.

Section 9.06 — Revocation Chains

Revocation propagates: Human revokes grant → Device DAC updated → KAAI agent certs invalidated → Action tokens cease → Mesh peers receive CRL within SLA.

Revocation chains MUST be testable quarterly.

Section 9.07 — Authorization Failure Modes

| Failure | Response |

|---------|----------|

| Expired cert | Deny + renewal prompt |

| Low trust | Deny + remediation guidance |

| Insufficient presence | Escalate to Keyra |

| Revoked grant | Deny + audit alert |

| Chain break | Deny + incident log |

Default deny always.

PART X — Multi-Device Mesh

Section 10.01 — Mesh Overview

A Personal Device Mesh comprises all devices under one human root — phone, Keyra Key, watch, laptop, vehicle, home hub, tablet, shared family devices with grants. Mesh provides synchronized trust state, presence handoff, and unified audit.

Section 10.02 — Mesh Topology

Typical professional mesh:

| Device | Mesh role |

|--------|-----------|

| Phone | Primary hub, vault replica |

| Keyra Key | Authorization root |

| Watch | Presence corroboration |

| Laptop | Productivity, secondary replica |

| Vehicle | Mobility trust domain |

| Home hub | Home device orchestrator |

| Office desktop | Enterprise partition |

| Tablet | Family shared |

Section 10.03 — Mesh Trust Protocol

Mesh Trust Protocol (MTP) synchronizes: DTC renewals, revocation lists, trust scores, companion context hashes. MTP operates encrypted peer-to-peer with Companion as orchestrator. Cloud relay MAY assist NAT traversal — holds ciphertext only.

Section 10.04 — Mesh Synchronization

Sync priorities: revocations first (< 60s), trust scores second (< 5 min), context third (best effort). Vector clocks resolve partition conflicts — human manual merge for vault conflicts.

Section 10.05 — Mesh Presence

Mesh Presence — active device knows peer presence state. Handoff from phone to laptop: phone signs handoff token, laptop validates, presence continuity P4 without re-biometric if < 2 min window.

Section 10.06 — Mesh Authorization

High-risk actions MAY require multi-device corroboration — phone + Keyra Key + watch tap within 30 seconds — for configured paranoid profiles.

Section 10.07 — Mesh Audit

Unified mesh audit log in Trust Vault — filterable by device_id. Export in DTEP.

Section 10.08 — Shared Device Mesh Boundaries

Family shared devices participate in sub-mesh — parent's mesh governs admin; child's presence profile bounded. Guest devices excluded from mesh trust — ephemeral only.

Section 10.09 — Scenario — Cross-Device Handoff

James reads email on phone during commute. Arrives office, opens laptop. Companion initiates mesh handoff — phone confirms P4, laptop receives continuity token, conversation context syncs. James authorizes calendar change on laptop — requires P3, trust 0.6 — passes. James later authorizes stock sale — requires P5 Keyra — laptop prompts; James taps Keyra Key in pocket via NFC — passes.

Section 10.10 — Mesh Trust Protocol Message Types

| Message | Priority | SLA |

|---------|----------|-----|

| REVOKE_BROADCAST | Critical | < 60s mesh-wide |

| TRUST_SCORE_DELTA | High | < 5 min |

| PRESENCE_HANDOFF | High | < 2s local |

| CONTEXT_SYNC | Normal | best effort |

| AUDIT_BATCH | Low | < 1 hour |

All messages signed with mesh sync key; replay protection via nonce and timestamp window.

Section 10.11 — Mesh Partition Tolerance

When devices partition (airplane mode, rural dead zone), local authorization decisions use cached CRL with max staleness 24h for low-risk; high-risk requires online validation or Keyra Key offline challenge-response with pre-provisioned counters.

Section 10.12 — Mesh Performance Targets

| Mesh size | Handoff p99 | Revoke propagate p99 |

|-----------|-------------|----------------------|

| 3 devices | 500ms | 5s |

| 7 devices | 1s | 15s |

| 15 devices (family+home) | 2s | 30s |

Section 10.13 — Failure Scenario — Mesh Desynchronization

Two devices partition; both believe peer revoked. On reunification, vector clocks reconcile; human presented merge UI if vault write conflicts occurred. Automatic merge prohibited for financial or legacy partitions.

PART XI — Device Trust Vault Integration

Section 11.01 — Integration Overview

Trust Vault holds secrets; devices hold access instruments. Device Trust Mesh binds vault partition unlock to device trust, presence, and authorization.

Section 11.02 — Identity Vault Access

Identity Vault credentials unlock on Personal Critical device with $ T \geq 0.5 $, P3 minimum. Export identity partition requires P5 Keyra.

Section 11.03 — Authorization Vault Access

Authorization Vault stores grants devices enforce. Devices read authorization graph replicas — never mutate without human-signed update.

Section 11.04 — Memory Vault Access

Memory Vault media streams to devices with retention policy check. Family Memory requires Family device class + grant.

Section 11.05 — Family Vault Access

Family Vault partitions unlock on Family Shared or Personal Critical devices registered in Family Trust Network.

Section 11.06 — Organization Vault Access

Organization Vault unlocks on Enterprise Managed devices with MDM compliance + employment edge valid. Termination revokes org partition access — personal partition persists.

Section 11.07 — Legacy Vault Access

Legacy Vault access follows inheritance triggers — successor device registration, identity verification, Keyra succession or break-glass per instrument.

Section 11.08 — Vault-Device Key Hierarchy

```

Human Root Key (Keyra Key derived)

├── Device Key (per device, in secure element)

│ ├── Vault Partition Key (wrapped)

│ └── Agent Signing Key (wrapped)

└── Mesh Sync Key (wrapped)

```

Wrapping keys MUST NOT leave secure hardware unencrypted.

PART XII — Device + Companion Integration

Section 12.01 — Integration Mandate

Keyra Companion operates through devices — never above device trust. Companion Charter duty of care includes device security narration and handoff integrity.

Section 12.02 — Companion Presence

Companion maintains presence awareness — which device is active, what level, freshness. Companion prompts escalation when action requires higher presence.

Section 12.03 — Companion Continuity

Companion Continuity across devices — conversation state, task context, memory refs — syncs via mesh with encrypted payloads. Continuity MUST NOT sync vault secrets without partition policy.

Section 12.04 — Companion Synchronization

Companion Synchronization prioritizes revocation and authorization updates over conversational fluff.

Section 12.05 — Companion Context

Companion Context — form factor, input mode, driving mode — informs Companion behavior. Vehicle mode suppresses distracting interactions per safety policy.

Section 12.06 — Companion Handoffs

Companion Handoffs require source device signing, target device validation, audit entry. Hijacked handoff attempts decay trust.

Section 12.07 — Authority

Companion authority is mediated — Companion requests device execute vault operation; device authorization engine validates. Companion cannot bypass.

Section 12.08 — Recovery

Companion recovery on new device: human pairing, Keyra Key binding, mesh restore from Trust Vault backup, trust probation.

PART XIII — Device + Agent Integration

Section 13.01 — Integration Mandate

KAAI agents execute on devices per KAAI Standard. Device Trust Mesh supplies attestation gate, device binding, and trust floor.

Section 13.02 — Agent Execution

Agent runtime on device validates: Agent Identity Certificate, Authorization Certificate, Device Trust Certificate, presence level, trust threshold — before tool execution.

Section 13.03 — Agent Trust

Agent effective trust modulated by device trust: $ T_{eff} = \min(T_{human \to agent}, T_{device}) $.

Section 13.04 — Agent Authorization

High-risk agent classes MUST declare `device_binding` and `min_device_trust` in Authority Certificate.

Section 13.05 — Agent Presence

Agents do not satisfy human presence. Autonomous agent action requires prior human grant with Absent Human Protocol or real-time P5 for each consequential action per policy.

Section 13.06 — Agent Accountability

Agent actions log device_id, attestation hash, presence level at execution — appended to KAAI-LOG and Device audit.

Section 13.07 — Agent Expiration

Agent grants expire; device trust decay may suspend agent before grant expiry if device trust falls below floor.

Section 13.08 — Agent Auditing

Quarterly audit: agents with device bindings match registered devices; orphaned bindings revoked.

PART XIV — Telecommunications Integration

Section 14.01 — Integration Overview

Carriers provide network identity — SIM, eSIM, subscriber identity — overlaying device trust. Carrier identity is subordinate to human sovereignty; never root.

Section 14.02 — SIM and eSIM

SIM/eSIM holds subscriber credentials. Device Trust Mesh binds SIM attestation to device_id — detect SIM swap fraud. SIM swap alone MUST NOT authorize vault access.

Section 14.03 — Subscriber Identity

Subscriber identity maps to human via carrier contract. Mapping is assertion — human pairs carrier account to Life Graph with OTP ceremony.

Section 14.04 — Carrier Identity

Carrier issues Carrier Identity Certificate — network authentication, not human sovereignty. Used for billing, lawful intercept hooks per jurisdiction — with human notification where law requires.

Section 14.05 — Network Identity

Network Identity — IP, radio, Wi-Fi attestation — advisory context for fraud detection. Never sole authorization factor.

Section 14.06 — Network Trust

Network Trust Score modulates risk — roaming, unknown towers increment $ R_s $ slightly. Does not replace device trust.

Section 14.07 — Network Authorization

Carrier APIs (e.g., number verification) MAY supplement presence for telecom-specific actions — porting number requires P5.

Section 14.08 — Network Settlement

Device trust events do not require carrier billing integration. Future machine-to-machine settlement may reference device attestation for fraud reduction — per agent economics instruments.

Section 14.09 — Scenario — SIM Swap Attack

Attacker social-engineers carrier to port number. Attacker possesses SMS but not device DIC or Keyra Key. Vault access denied. Trust system increments $ R_s $ on account; human notified via email and watch. Human revokes compromised phone cert from laptop.

PART XV — Vehicle Trust Architecture

Section 15.01 — Vehicle as Trust Domain

Vehicles are mobile device meshes — IVI, telematics, key fobs, phones, autonomous compute. Vehicle Trust Architecture governs driver identity, ownership, authorization, and emergency access.

Section 15.02 — Vehicle Identity

Vehicle Identity Certificate binds VIN, hardware roots, owner_human_id, registration jurisdiction.

Section 15.03 — Vehicle Companion

Vehicle Companion — navigation, safety, maintenance — bound to vehicle mesh. Distinct from personal Keyra Companion; synchronizes with phone mesh on pairing.

Section 15.04 — Vehicle Authorization

Driver authorization: key fob = P2, phone app = P3, Keyra Key = P5 for ownership transfer. Autonomous mode requires human pre-grant with geofence and duration.

Section 15.05 — Vehicle Trust

Vehicle trust incorporates: firmware integrity, tire pressure irrelevant, safety system attestation, driver presence (seat sensor advisory). Compromised IVI suspends autonomous features.

Section 15.06 — Vehicle Ownership

Ownership transfer requires P5 Keyra, title verification ref in Asset Vault, DAC reissuance, prior owner revocation.

Section 15.07 — Vehicle Transfer

Sale ceremony: buyer pairs phone, seller Keyra signs transfer, registry updates, seller keys revoked.

Section 15.08 — Vehicle Inheritance

Legacy instrument may designate vehicle beneficiary. Succession follows motor law + Device Trust Mesh ceremony.

Section 15.09 — Vehicle Emergency Access

Vehicle Emergency Access — emergency services override lawful per jurisdiction — logs to vehicle audit; owner notified post-event where law permits.

PART XVI — Smart Home Trust Architecture

Section 16.01 — Home as Trust Domain

Smart home comprises hub, speakers, cameras, locks, thermostats, appliances — Home Trust Graph federated under human root.

Section 16.02 — Home Identity

Home Identity Certificate binds property ref, hub device_id, owner_human_id, family_id optional.

Section 16.03 — Home Companion

Home Companion orchestrates automation — subordinate to personal Companion. Voice commands require presence profile per room device.

Section 16.04 — Device Authorization

Each IoT device holds constrained cert — gateway human provisions. Devices cannot authorize vault access.

Section 16.05 — Family Access

Family members receive presence profiles — parent full, child bounded (no door unlock), guest time-limited.

Section 16.06 — Guest Access

Guest Wi-Fi + guest presence — expires automatically. No Life Graph write.

Section 16.07 — Emergency Access

Fire, medical — break-glass unlock per pre-authorized Emergency Vault template; audit mandatory.

Section 16.08 — Home Trust Graph

`Home → contains → Device` edges with trust scores. Compromised camera decays home trust, isolates device, alerts human.

PART XVII — Enterprise Device Trust

Section 17.01 — Enterprise Overview

Enterprises manage device fleets — employee, executive, shared, critical infrastructure. Enterprise trust supplements human sovereignty; never supersedes personal vault partitions.

Section 17.02 — Employee Devices

BYOD and COPE models: dual partitions, MDM attestation feeds $ I_s $, employment edge revocation on termination.

Section 17.03 — Executive Devices

Elevated target — require $ T \geq 0.8 $, P5 for org vault, continuous integrity monitoring, dedicated Keyra Key RECOMMENDED.

Section 17.04 — Shared Devices

Kiosk, conference room — Guest Ephemeral class only. No employee personal vault.

Section 17.05 — Critical Infrastructure Devices

Industrial Certified class — sector HSM, air-gapped options, agent class restrictions, government certification overlays.

Section 17.06 — Government Devices

Government-issued devices — sovereign attestation CA, classified data handling per national policy, lawful access integration without human root usurpation on personal devices illegally.

Section 17.07 — Enterprise Scenario — Departure

Employee leaves company. Organization revokes org partition, MDM wipe org apps. Employee personal partition exports via TVEP. Device trust personal certs persist. Org-bound agent certs revoke.

Section 17.08 — BYOD Policy Requirements

BYOD programs MUST document: partition boundary, org wipe scope, personal vault persistence, MDM visibility limits, offboarding timeline, dispute resolution. Enrollment without signed human acknowledgment is non-conformant.

Section 17.09 — Executive Protection Profile

Executive devices implement: dedicated Keyra Key, $ T \geq 0.8 $ for all org vault access, geo-advisory anomaly alerts, 24h integrity attestation, no shared device login, companion security briefing on travel.

Section 17.10 — Critical Infrastructure Overlap

Industrial and government critical infrastructure devices MAY operate air-gapped meshes with delayed federation sync — max CRL staleness 72h for isolated networks with documented risk acceptance and human sign-off.

Section 17.11 — Enterprise Trust Score Overlay

Enterprise overlay modifies authorization without replacing human root:

\[ T_{enterprise} = \min(T_{device}, C_{mdm}) \]

where $ C_{mdm} \in [0,1] $ is MDM compliance score. Non-compliant device cannot access org vault regardless of personal trust.

PART XVIII — Sovereign Device Trust

Section 18.01 — Sovereign Overview

Nations participate in Device Trust Mesh through national overlays — accreditation, certification, lawful access — without becoming root owners of citizen devices.

Section 18.02 — National Device Identity

National Device Identity programs issue accredited registrar status — not compulsory device ownership.

Section 18.03 — National Device Certification

Certification labs validate secure element implementations, Keyra Key manufacturing, automotive device profiles.

Section 18.04 — National Trust Networks

National trust networks federate CRL, incident response, stolen device registries — pseudonymous device_id only.

Section 18.05 — National Authorization Networks

Lawful authorization networks — court orders, national security — operate through exception channels with enhanced audit and human challenge rights per Human Sovereignty Charter.

Section 18.06 — Cross-Border Trust

Cross-border trust via federation treaties — mutual recognition of Device Registrar accreditation, mapped jurisdiction tags on certificates.

Section 18.07 — Cross-Border Authorization

Authorization valid across border when grant includes jurisdiction scope and destination device meets local minimum trust.

Section 18.08 — Sovereignty Invariant

No national program may prohibit human device revocation, portable export, or Keyra Key use as root anchor.

PART XIX — Device Lifecycle

Section 19.01 — Lifecycle Overview

Devices traverse governed lifecycle from manufacture to destruction. Each transition requires audit; key material handled per cryptographic erasure standards.

Section 19.02 — Manufacture

Manufacturer provisions hardware root, secure element, initial firmware. Blank human ownership — no pre-bound surveillance keys without disclosure.

Section 19.03 — Registration

Human pairs device — DIC issued, Life Graph edge, trust initialized.

Section 19.04 — Provisioning

Apps, vault replicas, companion binding, mesh membership configured.

Section 19.05 — Activation

Device Active — full mesh participation.

Section 19.06 — Operation

Ongoing attestation, trust scoring, certificate renewal.

Section 19.07 — Repair

Repair custody — manufacturer or shop holds physical device; human retains root. Temporary Suspension optional. Repair completion re-attestation required.

Section 19.08 — Ownership Transfer

Sale or gift — P5 ceremony, prior owner revocation, new owner pairing.

Section 19.09 — Retirement

Device removed from mesh — certs revoked, vault replicas migrated, factory reset with cryptographic erase.

Section 19.10 — Destruction

Physical destruction — audit record, registry tombstone, keys already revoked.

Section 19.11 — Recycling

E-waste recycling — cryptographic erase MUST precede physical transfer. Recycler attestation optional.

Section 19.12 — Lifecycle State Table

|-------|--------------|------|-------|

| Manufactured | No | No | Manufacturer only |

| Destroyed | N/A | N/A | Tombstone |

PART XX — Quantum & Future Security

Section 20.01 — Post-Quantum Cryptography and 50-Year Roadmap

Post-Quantum Cryptography migration and 50-year roadmap — Device Trust Mesh architectures for 50-year durability with post-quantum cryptography, evolving hardware roots, mesh scale to trillions of IoT endpoints, and autonomous device ethics.

Section 20.02 — Post-Quantum Cryptography

Migration path: hybrid classical/PQC signatures on Device Identity Certificates by 2030 RECOMMENDED; PQC-only by 2038 for new issuances. Life Graph stores algorithm agility metadata.

Section 20.03 — Future Hardware Roots

Plausible evolutions: chiplet secure enclaves, optical PUFs, biometric template protection in law, implanted medical devices as presence factors — each requires human opt-in and Charter review.

Section 20.04 — Future Secure Elements

Secure elements trend toward dedicated RISC-V secure cores, open-source auditable firmware, manufacturer liability for backdoors.

Section 20.05 — Future Identity Anchors

Identity may incorporate multi-modal anchors — Keyra Key + voice + gait on wearables — always with human disclosure and revocation.

Section 20.06 — Future Device Meshes

Meshes expand to neural interfaces, ambient computing rooms, augmented reality persistent worlds — same invariants: human root, hardware anchor, default deny.

Section 20.07 — Future Agent Meshes

Agent meshes coordinate swarms — delegation depth limits, trust inheritance caps, prohibited autonomous weaponization per governance council and Human Sovereignty Charter.

Section 20.08 — Roadmap Phases

| Phase | Years | Milestone |

|-------|-------|-----------|

| 1 — Foundation | 0–5 | Keyra Key, phone/laptop mesh, KAAI binding |

| 2 — Environment | 5–15 | Vehicle, home, industrial integration |

| 3 — Federation | 15–30 | Global registry, national overlays, PQC |

| 4 — Civilization | 30–50 | Billion-human scale, autonomous device governance |

Section 20.09 — Research Alignment

Aligns with NIST PQC, FIDO Alliance, W3C DIDs, ISO/IEC 19790, automotive UNECE cyber regulations — interoperable, not dependent.

Section 20.10 — Quantum Threat Timeline

| Era | Threat | Mesh response |

|-----|--------|---------------|

| 2025–2030 | Harvest now, decrypt later | Hybrid certs; sensitivity tagging |

| 2030–2035 | Early cryptanalytic breaks | Accelerated PQC migration |

| 2035–2045 | Broad quantum capability | Legacy cert sunset |

| 2045+ | Mature post-quantum era | Algorithm agility as norm |

Vault and device keys tagged by sensitivity — Legacy Vault contents encrypted with first-to-migrate policy.

Section 20.11 — Billion-Device Projections

At one billion humans averaging 4.5 registered devices each (~4.5B devices):

Edge-first validation — 94% of trust checks local via Companion cache

Regional registry clusters — < 40ms p99 discovery
CRL bloom filters — 1e-6 false positive with OCSP fallback
IoT gateway aggregation — home hub validates 50 constrained devices

At 10B IoT endpoints: gateway delegation mandatory; constrained cert 24h TTL; human authorization at provision only.

Section 20.12 — Autonomous Device Ethics

Future Autonomous Devices MUST implement: geofenced operation, duration limits, remote kill switch via human revocation, incident logging, prohibition on lethal force authorization without national law explicitly mapped — and even then human accountability chain REQUIRED per KAAI Standard.

PART XXI — Device Civilization Layer

Section 21.01 — Civilization Overview

Device Trust Mesh at civilization scale is infrastructure — like roads, power grids, property registries — enabling digital society without centralized human surveillance.

Section 21.02 — Personal Infrastructure

Every human operates Personal Infrastructure — personal mesh with 3–7 devices average — Keyra Key anchor, phone hub, wearables, home, vehicle.

Section 21.03 — Family Infrastructure

Family Infrastructure federates device sharing — constitution governs child devices, elder support, shared home.

Section 21.04 — Enterprise Infrastructure

Enterprise Infrastructure — organizations operate fleet trust with MDM, compliance, executive protection — subordinate to member humans.

Section 21.05 — National Infrastructure

National Infrastructure — nations accredit registrars, respond to stolen devices, participate in federation — protect citizens without owning devices.

Section 21.06 — Global Trust Infrastructure

Global Trust Infrastructure — Device Registry shards, CRL federation, incident sharing, standards governance council — no single sovereign.

Section 21.07 — Scale Scenarios

One person: Phone + Keyra Key + watch mesh; local-first validation; cloud relay optional.

One million: Regional registry shards; < 50ms discovery p99.

One billion: Bloom-filter revocation; edge Companion cache; 95% authorization local.

Section 21.08 — Civilizational Invariants

At any scale: human root authority, hardware subordination to human, revocable trust, auditable presence, portable export. Scale changes caching — not principles.

Section 21.09 — Migration Path from Today's Internet

Phase 1: Device identity certificates on phones and laptops (years 0–5). Phase 2: Keyra Key deployment and mesh handoff (years 3–10). Phase 3: Vehicle, home, IoT integration (years 8–20). Phase 4: Global federation and PQC migration (years 15–30). Parallel operation with legacy password auth during transition — default deny for vault without mesh conformance increasing over time.

Section 21.10 — Population Scenarios

Scenario — Billion-human mesh: Average 4.5 devices per human; 4.5B registered devices; federation sharded by region; no single registry query path for all devices.

Scenario — Refugee displacement: Human exports DTEP before border crossing; re-pairs devices in destination jurisdiction; national overlay may require re-accreditation but MUST NOT confiscate human root keys.

Scenario — Elder cognitive decline: Guardian receives bounded device administration grant — not root — per Family Constitution; Keyra Key remains with elder until incapacity instrument triggers succession.

Section 21.11 — Performance Benchmarks (Target)

| Scale | Trust check p99 | Revoke propagate p99 |

|-------|-----------------|----------------------|

| Personal mesh (7 devices) | 20ms local | 30s |

| 1B devices global | 50ms edge | 60s |

| 10B IoT (gateway) | 100ms gateway | 90s |

PART XXII — Closing Declaration

Section 22.01 — On Presence

Trust begins with presence — not because humans are always physically typing, but because authorization without presence is permission without personhood. The Device Trust Mesh exists so presence is provable, bounded, and revocable — not surveilled.

Presence matters because a device without a human is a machine; a human without presence proof is a guess.

Section 22.02 — On Hardware

Presence begins with hardware — secure elements, Keyra Keys, attested integrity. Software alone cannot carry the weight of billion-human civilization. Hardware is the anchor; human is the captain.

Hardware matters because extractable keys become extractable lives.

Section 22.03 — On Human Supremacy

Hardware remains subordinate to humans — not because hardware is weak, but because sovereignty defines personhood. No manufacturer, carrier, platform, or government is root. The human pairs, grants, revokes, inherits, and exports. Devices serve.

Human supremacy matters because trust infrastructure without human root becomes control infrastructure.

Section 22.04 — On Devices as Participants

Devices are trusted participants — not mere endpoints, not property of platforms, not opaque vectors of extraction. They hold identity, prove integrity, mediate vault access, bind agents, and hand off continuity — always within human grant.

Participation matters because civilization-scale digital life requires billions of instruments acting in concert under law.

Section 22.05 — On the Physical Foundation

The Device Trust Mesh is the physical foundation of digital civilization — beneath Life Graphs that structure, Trust Vaults that persist, Companions that mediate, agents that act. Without device trust, digital civilization floats untethered — impersonatable, uninheritable, unaccountable.

Section 22.06 — On Identity, Trust, and Authorization

Identity begins with hardware. Trust begins with presence. Authorization begins with human intent. These three sentences are not marketing. They are engineering requirements for any society that treats humans as sovereign persons rather than data subjects.

Section 22.07 — Timeless Commitment

We declare the Device Trust Mesh Architecture the canonical hardware-rooted trust framework for the Keyra Companion Ecosystem — and a reference for any civilization that dares to anchor digital life in physical reality while subordinating all instruments to human authority.

The mesh is not a network diagram. The mesh is a covenant between human and device. The covenant belongs to the human. Always.

Section 22.08 — Invocation

To every human pairing their first device: you anchor what was always yours. To every parent provisioning a child's tablet: you bound trust with love and law. To every elder succession-planning Keyra Keys: you extend authority beyond breath. To every implementer building devices: map every attestation to sovereignty — or do not build.

Section 22.09 — Canonical Status

This instrument joins the founding frameworks of the Keyra Companion Ecosystem as the authoritative reference for device identity, presence verification, trust scoring, mesh synchronization, Keyra Key architecture, and hardware-rooted authorization — for the century ahead and beyond.

Implementers of phones, wearables, keys, vehicles, homes, carriers, and enterprise MDM must map every capability to explicit sections of this framework. Features without device trust governance mapping are design defects. Features that weaken human root authority for institutional convenience are constitutional violations.

Section 22.10 — On the Century Ahead

This framework is written for humans not yet born — whose great-grandparents today pair their first Keyra Keys. Devices will change form. Quantum computers will arrive. Autonomous systems will proliferate. The invariants must not change: human root authority, hardware anchoring subordinate to human, presence-gated authorization, portable trust, dignified succession. Implementation may evolve; principles endure.

The Device Trust Mesh is the bedrock — not of silicon, but of personhood in the computational age.

Section 22.11 — Acknowledgment of Founding Instruments

This Architecture stands with the Human Sovereignty Charter, Trust Vault Architecture, KAAI Standard, Life Graph Architecture, Companion Charter, Human Digital Twin Architecture, Family Trust Network, Organization Graph Enterprise Companion Framework, and Life Operating System as co-equal founding architecture of the Keyra Companion Ecosystem — each necessary, none sufficient alone.

Implementers who build vaults without device trust build unlockable secrets. Implementers who build devices without vault integration build orphaned hardware. The ecosystem requires both.

Section 22.12 — Perpetual Subordination Clause

This Architecture may be amended for technical agility — algorithms, device classes, mesh optimizations. It may never be amended to permit device sovereignty over humans, manufacturer root over human root, compulsory surveillance as presence, or unauditable consequential authorization. Such amendments are void ab initio per the Human Sovereignty Charter.

Section 22.13 — Declaration on Multi-Device Life

We declare that humans live across devices — not as accounts, but as persons whose intent must persist across handoffs without surrendering sovereignty to any single screen.

Section 22.14 — Declaration on Families and Shared Space

We declare that families and households require shared device trust — bounded, auditable, revocable — that protects children without surveilling them, guests without exploiting them, elders without abandoning them.

Section 22.15 — Declaration on Institutions

We declare that enterprises and governments participate as custodians and certifiers, not as sovereigns over personal device trust. MDM compliance feeds attestation; it does not own the human vault.

Section 22.16 — Call to Implementers

To device manufacturers: ship secure elements with auditable firmware. To carriers: bind SIM to device without usurping human root. To MDM vendors: partition org and personal trust. To humans: demand mesh conformance for devices that touch your money, health, children, and legal standing.

Section 22.17 — Call to Nations

To nations: accredit registrars, protect citizen revocation rights, participate in federation without capture, and never treat device networks as exempt from accountability because hardware is novel.

Section 22.18 — Glossary of Core Terms

| Term | Definition |

|------|------------|

| Device Trust Mesh | Hardware-rooted trust fabric connecting human devices |

| DIC | Device Identity Certificate |

| DTC | Device Trust Certificate |

| DAC | Device Authority Certificate |

| DTEP | Device Trust Export Pack |

| Keyra Key | Hardware authorization anchor device |

| MTP | Mesh Trust Protocol |

| Presence level | P0–P5 scale of human physical engagement proof |

| Trust score | $ T \in [0,1] $ device trustworthiness metric |

| Mesh | Federated set of devices under one human root |

| Attestation | Hardware-signed integrity report |

| Succession | Governed transfer of device trust on death or replacement |

Section 22.19 — Conformance Self-Assessment Checklist

Organizations MAY use this checklist for Device Trust Mesh readiness:

All consequential devices registered with Device Identity Certificates

Keyra Keys deployed for roles requiring P5 authorization

MDM attestation feeds integrity score where applicable

Personal/org vault partitions separated on BYOD

KAAI agents declare device_binding where required

Revocation SLA tested quarterly across mesh

Trust scores maintained with decay and evidence updates

Legacy Vault contains device and Keyra succession instruments

DTEP export validated without vendor dependency

Audit logs hash-chained to Trust Vault

Conformance is a journey; partial conformance with documented roadmap is valid if audited.

Section 22.20 — Document Maintenance

Device Trust Mesh 1.0 is the founding architecture. Technical errata publish quarterly. Minor version (1.x) may add device classes and profiles. Major version (2.0) requires governance council supermajority and human rights review. Constitutional subordination to the Human Sovereignty Charter is immutable across all versions.

Section 22.21 — Final Affirmation

We affirm that every human — infant with a family tablet, elder with a medical wearable, refugee with a single phone, executive with a fleet, farmer with an autonomous tractor — deserves devices that participate in trust under their authority, across meshes, across generations, across mortality's threshold to those they designate.

This is not a privilege of the technical elite. It is infrastructure of human dignity in the age of ubiquitous computation.

Trust begins with presence. Presence begins with hardware. Hardware serves the human. The human belongs to themselves. Always.

End of Document

The Device Trust Mesh v1.0 — Founding Architecture of the Keyra Companion Ecosystem